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In this paper we analyze the nature of the shocks hitting the EMU member 
countries over the period 1991-2004, as well as for the two subperiods before and after 
1999, i.e., the start of EMU. To this end, we first evaluate the relative importance of 
symmetric vs. asymmetric shocks, and then extract their temporary component. Our 
final aim would be assessing the vulnerability of the EMU countries to temporary and 
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Starting in January 1st 1999, 12 European countries have formed a monetary union, the 
so called Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, as stressed by the literature 
on optimum currency areas initiated in Mundell (1961), the presence of asymmetric 
shocks (i.e., those requiring a different optimal policy response in different countries) 
means a potential difficulty for the adequate working of a monetary union. The 
argument is well known: a common monetary policy for all the member countries of the 
union cannot be the proper instrument when facing asymmetric shocks. The ultimate 
reason is that forming a monetary union means for each member country, not only 
surrendering monetary policy independence, but also losing the exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the other members of the union as a policy instrument; and this in turn raises the 
importance of fiscal policy in order to cope with asymmetric shocks (Bajo-Rubio and 
Díaz-Roldán, 2003). Accordingly, in the years before the start of EMU a large number 
of empirical studies, using different methodologies, have appeared, aiming to 
characterize the kind of shocks hitting the European economies as well as the main 
features of their business cycle; a non exhaustive list would include, among others, 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), von Hagen and Neumann 
(1994), Helg et al. (1995), Bayoumi and Prasad (1997), Forni and Reichlin (2001), 
Barrios and de Lucio (2003) or Artis et al. (2004). 
 
In an influential contribution, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) have argued that it is 
not enough to determine whether shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. More 
specifically, the distinction between permanent and transitory shocks would be also 
relevant. The basic argument runs as follows. Faced to a permanent, e.g., adverse output 
shock, a country would respond optimally through the corresponding fall in demand, so 
the trade balance would remain in equilibrium. But, if the same shock were transitory, 
the optimal response would be to maintain spending roughly unchanged, which would 
be achieved through a trade deficit via a real exchange rate appreciation. However, in 
the search of a new equilibrium the countries would overreact, on failing to recognize 
the trade balance externality that appears in a monetary union; and this inefficiency 
would occur for both symmetric and asymmetric shocks (although to a lesser extent for 
the former). Therefore, asymmetric and  temporary shocks would be those more 
potentially harmful for the operation of a monetary union [see Cohen and Wyplosz 
(1989) for details]. 
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On the other hand, Frankel and Rose (1998) claim that a greater economic 
integration would lead to increased trade, which would result in more highly correlated 
business cycles. Although this effect might be offset by an increase in industrial 
specialization by country, and hence more asynchronous business cycles resulting from 
industry-specific shocks [as argued, e.g., by Krugman (1993)], Frankel and Rose present 
evidence from twenty industrialized countries over a thirty-year period, supporting their 
hypothesis. As an implication of these results, Frankel and Rose argue that, by expanding 
trade among members and increasing the correlation of their business cycles, EMU might 
be more desirable ex post than ex ante. 
 
Some evidence on the above lines is provided in Rose and Engel (2002) using a 
sample of 210 countries between 1960 and 1996. Countries that are members of a currency 
union, Rose and Engel conclude, would have more trade and more highly synchronized 
business cycles, as compared with countries having their own monies. In turn, Alesina et 
al. (2002) find, from a similar data set, that the formation of a monetary union would tend 
to increase the volume of bilateral trade and the co-movement of prices among members, 
but would not be systematically related to the co-movement of outputs. However, 
Tenreyro and Barro (2003) observe that the estimation of the effects of a monetary union 
on economic variables could be affected by a problem of endogeneity. Once this problem 
is addressed, using an instrumental variables approach, Tenreyro and Barro obtain that the 
co-movement of outputs would actually decrease following the formation of a monetary 
union, which they interpret as consistent with the view that currency unions lead to 
greater sectoral specialization. Notice, on the other hand, that none of these papers 
analyze the case of EMU. 
 
In this paper we re-examine the issue of the nature of the shocks hitting the EMU 
member countries, before and after the start of EMU, given the availability of time series 
long enough for such an exercise. As a particularly interesting feature of our results, we 
should be able to understand whether the formation of EMU had led to a greater similarity 
of the participating economies (confirming Frankel and Rose’s arguments) or, on the 
contrary, to an increase in specialization, which would have important consequences on the 
working of EMU in practice. The empirical methodology, together with the main results, is 
presented in the next section; the final section concludes. 
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2. Methodology and empirical results 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) proposed a simple method for assessing the relative 
importance of, first, symmetric versus asymmetric shocks; and, second, permanent 
versus temporary shocks. Denoting as X1 and X2 the levels of a particular variable for 
two economies: 
•  First, in the spirit of Aoki (1981), symmetric shocks are identified with their 
sum, X 1+X2, and asymmetric shocks with their difference, X 1−X2. Next, the 
relative importance of symmetric versus asymmetric shocks would be evaluated 
by their corresponding standard deviations.  
•  Second, the temporary component of both symmetric and asymmetric shocks is 
calculated. Next, the ratio of the standard deviation of these temporary 
components over the standard deviation of each original series would measure 
the extent of permanent versus temporary shocks, for either symmetric or 
asymmetric shocks. 
  
This procedure was applied by Cohen and Wyplosz to three variables (real GDP, 
GDP deflator, and real wages) for the period 1965-1987, to analyze the kind of shocks 
experienced by, on the one hand, France and Germany, and, on the other hand, either 
“Europe” (made as the sum of France and Germany) or the United States. They 
concluded that, from the point of view of the shocks they faced, a monetary union 
would make more sense between France and Germany, than between “Europe” and the 
United States. 
 
  In this section we apply the above method to real GDP data (in million of euros, 
at 1995 prices and exchange rates, seasonally adjusted), for all the countries 
participating in EMU (except Luxembourg), against the whole euro zone (excluding the 
country concerned, in each case). In addition, we have also considered the case of the 
three EU members that chose not to participate in EMU from the start, i.e., Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The data are quarterly, cover the period 1991.1 
through 2004.4 (except for Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, where the data are available 
from 1997.1, 1995.1, and 1993.1, respectively), and are taken from Eurostat. Finally, 
the exercise has been performed for the whole period, and for the two subperiods 
1991.1-1998.4 and 1999.1-2004.4, in order to assess whether the nature of the shocks 
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faced by the European economies would have changed, before and after the start of 
EMU. 
 
  The results for the whole period are presented in Table 1. In part A of the table, 
columns (1) and (2) show, respectively, the size of symmetric and asymmetric shocks, 
as measured by their standard deviation; and column (3) shows their relative 
importance, assessed by the ratio of the standard deviation of symmetric shocks to that 
of asymmetric shocks (so that a ratio above one would mean a greater weight of 
symmetric shocks). In turn, part B of the table shows the ratio of the standard deviation 
of the temporary component to the standard deviation of the original series, for both 
symmetric and symmetric shocks; where the temporary component has been calculated 
using three alternative methods: a linear trend, a quadratic trend, and the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.  
 
  As can be seen, for all the EMU countries symmetric shocks would have been 
quantitatively more important than asymmetric shocks over the period of analysis
1. 
However, when computing their temporary component, the latter would have been 
clearly higher for asymmetric than for symmetric shocks, with the exceptions of 
Germany, Ireland, and, to a lower extent, Spain and Italy. Finally, the pattern for the 
three countries that chose not to participate in EMU is not very different from that 
followed by the rest. 
 
The results before and after the start of EMU appear in tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. First, we can see that the relatively greater importance of symmetric 
shocks (i.e., a favourable event for the performance of EMU) would have decreased, 
from the first subperiod to the second, for Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal (in the last three cases, rather slightly), remaining 
unchanged for Ireland. On the contrary, symmetric shocks would have been relatively 
                                                 
1   Notice that, denoting as var and cov the variance and covariance, respectively:  
var (X1+X2) = var (X1) + var (X2) + 2 cov (X1, X2) 
var (X1−X2) = var (X1) + var (X2) − 2 cov (X1, X2) 
so that the standard deviation of (X1+X2) will be higher (lower) than the standard deviation of 
(X1−X2), provided that the covariance between X1 and X2 was positive (negative). In other words, 
the result obtained in Table 1 (i.e., that symmetric shocks would have been quantitatively more 
important than asymmetric shocks) would imply that the real GDP of each EMU member 
country would have been positively correlated with that of the rest of the euro zone. 
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more important once EMU in force, only for France and Finland and, interestingly, for 
the three “outsiders” (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
 
Second, when looking at the temporary component of symmetric shocks, during 
the second subperiod it would have decreased, or remained at similar levels, for France, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Finland, and Spain, increasing for the rest. Finally, the temporary 
component of asymmetric shocks would have remained roughly unchanged in the EMU 
subperiod for Belgium, Spain, Ireland, and Finland; it would have fallen only for 
Germany, Greece, and Italy, and increased for France, the Netherlands, Austria, 




In this paper we have analyzed the nature of the shocks hitting the EMU member countries 
over the period 1991-2004, as well as for the two subperiods before and after 1999, i.e., the 
start of EMU. According to our results, during the whole period symmetric shocks would 
have clearly predominated over asymmetric shocks, which would be in principle “good 
news” for EMU. However, despite their lower relative weight, the temporary component 
of asymmetric shocks would have been higher than that of symmetric shocks. In other 
words, although asymmetric shocks would have been less important in quantitative terms 
than symmetric shocks, when occurring, they would have been potentially more harmful. 
These results, on the other hand, would not be too different to those found for the three 
countries that chose not to participate in EMU from its start. 
 
Next, we analyzed the change between the two subperiods, before and after the 
start of EMU in January 1999. First, the relatively greater importance of symmetric vs. 
asymmetric shocks would have decreased in most cases (although sometimes very 
slightly), increasing only for France and Finland, as well as for the three “outsiders” 
(Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Turning to the importance of the 
temporary component of shocks, the results were less clear-cut. In particular, regarding 
the degree of temporariness of asymmetric shocks (the most harmful case for a 
monetary union, according to Cohen and Wyplosz), this would have decreased only for 
Germany, Greece, and Italy.  
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Although these results should be taken with a lot of caution, due to the still short 
period of time available for analysis, they would support to some extent an increased 
specialization in production following the formation of EMU. In addition, our results do 
not allow to discern any different pattern between the European “centre” and “periphery” 
[as in, e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)], or for the three countries that chose not to 
participate in EMU from its start. 
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Table 1. Vulnerability to shocks in EMU: Whole period 1991.1-2004.4 
 







) 2 ( ) 1 (  
Belgium  0.0740 0.0042  17.27 
Germany  0.0690 0.0213    3.23 
Greece  0.0887 0.0220    4.02 
Spain  0.0891 0.0168    5.28 
France  0.0748 0.0037  20.24 
Ireland  0.0924 0.0477    1.93 
Italy  0.0678 0.0118    5.71 
Netherlands  0.0836 0.0126    6.59 
Austria  0.0769 0.0055  13.78 
Portugal  0.0616 0.0092    6.64 
Finland  0.0959 0.0229    4.18 
     
Denmark  0.0783 0.0083    9.37 
Sweden  0.0789 0.0094    8.32 




Table 1B. Temporary component of the shocks 
 
Symmetric Asymmetric   
L  Q HP L Q HP 
Belgium  15.74 14.96  9.68 99.32  84.77 76.52 
Germany  21.54 20.29  9.70 29.21  16.37 12.12 
Greece  22.74 15.65  7.67 55.76  36.42 22.71 
Spain  20.96 18.14  7.50 30.40  23.79 17.24 
France  21.86 19.43  9.18 92.09  84.49 68.96 
Ireland  19.16   8.86 11.33  19.16  11.99 13.69 
Italy  21.47 20.48  9.95 38.27  25.00 19.96 
Netherlands  22.25 22.23  8.34 72.71  85.16 22.79 
Austria  19.60 19.14  7.45 95.22  66.67 53.14 
Portugal  25.68 12.87 11.01 99.32  37.30 40.26 
Finland  23.41 21.69  9.56 47.49  46.87 30.82 
         
Denmark  20.49 20.44  8.74 94.10  64.75 42.91 
Sweden  11.57 10.08  7.73 42.87  38.93 34.74 
United Kingdom  17.94 17.29  6.25 45.70  41.67 25.21 
 
 
Note:   L, Q, and HP denote the method used to smooth the original series, i.e., a linear trend, a 
quadratic trend, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter, respectively. 
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Table 2. Vulnerability to shocks in EMU: Subperiod 1991.1-1998.4 
 







) 2 ( ) 1 (  
Belgium  0.0371 0.0034  10.84 
Germany  0.0330 0.0076    4.34 
Greece  0.0377 0.0067    5.63 
Spain  0.0409 0.0077    5.24 
France  0.0333 0.0043    7.74 
Ireland  0.0292 0.0150    1.95 
Italy  0.0338 0.0035    9.60 
Netherlands  0.0451 0.0117    3.84 
Austria  0.0392 0.0058    6.74 
Portugal  0.0314 0.0094    3.33 
Finland  0.0492 0.0174    2.82 
     
Denmark  0.0442 0.0104    4.25 
Sweden  0.0393 0.0068    5.70 




Table 2B. Temporary component of the shocks 
 
Symmetric Asymmetric   
L  Q HP L Q HP 
Belgium  26.12 17.92 19.30 76.50  80.75 75.07 
Germany  26.08 17.15 18.76 51.86  28.50 34.10 
Greece  35.51 17.13 21.62 97.62  74.23 79.24 
Spain  30.37 13.68 17.72 61.13  25.24 33.99 
France  28.39 16.11 18.83 58.05  56.63 52.87 
Ireland  21.24 12.63 21.18 24.74  20.82 24.70 
Italy  27.80 18.87 20.21 82.08  78.33 75.18 
Netherlands  22.89 10.69 13.52 22.78  16.22 17.20 
Austria  18.56 10.92 12.53 48.71  38.80 39.19 
Portugal  11.71 6.40 11.09  24.19  24.17  24.12 
Finland  41.06 16.01 22.31 74.97  34.57 43.88 
         
Denmark  21.84 16.66 16.97 43.86  42.20 40.01 
Sweden  19.93 11.97 11.74 19.04  34.15 38.83 
United Kingdom  17.39 10.84 11.93 31.81  30.56 29.18 
 
 




Table 3. Vulnerability to shocks in EMU: Subperiod 1999.1-2004.4 
 







) 2 ( ) 1 (  
Belgium  0.0273 0.0071    3.84 
Germany  0.0264 0.0127    2.08 
Greece  0.0433 0.0213    2.03 
Spain  0.0357 0.0081    4.39 
France  0.0299 0.0028  10.49 
Ireland  0.0582 0.0298    1.95 
Italy  0.0258 0.0069    3.73 
Netherlands  0.0243 0.0078    3.11 
Austria  0.0265 0.0062    4.26 
Portugal  0.0235 0.0087    2.69 
Finland  0.0349 0.0076    4.56 
     
Denmark  0.0264 0.0047    5.55 
Sweden  0.0320 0.0047    6.70 




Table 3B. Temporary component of the shocks 
 
Symmetric Asymmetric   
L  Q HP L Q HP 
Belgium  30.11 21.82 26.04 87.64  68.65 77.76 
Germany  35.40 20.14 28.17 24.63  21.25 22.51 
Greece  14.32 11.52 12.86 23.01  20.93 21.71 
Spain  21.70 12.40 17.32 41.20  30.99 35.64 
France  31.58 18.94 25.39 95.40  87.01 89.57 
Ireland  23.16 12.67 19.00 22.10  19.56 21.04 
Italy  34.77 18.75 27.36 29.41  26.51 27.55 
Netherlands  40.90 22.82 32.34 26.99  26.97 26.78 
Austria  28.42 18.94 23.45 72.84  51.29 61.89 
Portugal  44.87 23.79 35.06 36.97  35.83 36.30 
Finland  21.77 16.75 18.88 70.20  53.57 61.31 
         
Denmark  29.25 49.38 23.74 65.10  78.95 56.21 
Sweden  23.33 16.44 19.62 87.14  63.34 74.62 
United Kingdom  19.89 13.82 16.63 65.15  31.91 50.41 
 
 
Note:   See Table 1. 
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